Setting the Record Straight on Mark I Containment History

March 18, 2011

Recently, several news stories have reported that the design of the Mark I containment system in the nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant has a history of problems. As the speculation contained in these stories has been picked up by a number of other media outlets and political commentators, we’d like to set the record straight. We believe it is too early to know specifically what has happened in each of the reactors at Fukushima Daiichi. We are committed to participating in the search for the facts. However, we can address the 40 year history of the technology and its performance to date:

Claim: The Mark I reactor is less “physically robust” than competing pressurized water reactors.

Fact: The Mark I meets all regulatory requirements and has performed well for over 40 years. Differences in the primary containment systems used in different reactor designs – including differences in size of the containment vessel — are largely a function of the different operating characteristics of those designs. For example, GE’s containment systems utilize pressure suppression technology, where a pool of water is available to condense steam in the event of an accident and reduce the pressures on the containment vessel. Units are built to withstand predicted peak containment pressures based upon their design under accident guidelines.

Claim: The Mark I should have been discontinued, based on a statement made in 1972 by Stephen Hanauer, an Atomic Energy Commission official, who said that its smaller containment design was more susceptible to explosion and rupture from a buildup of hydrogen.

Fact: In 1980 the NRC advised that it had given careful consideration to concerns raised by Mr. Hanauer’s 1972 memorandum about the Mark I and that “the staff, including Dr. Hanauer, has concluded that the pressure suppression concept for containment design is safe.”

Claim: The Mark I was “cheaper and easier to build – in part because they [GE] used a comparatively smaller and less expensive containment structure.”

Fact: Because of the pressure suppression capability designed into the Mark I, we are able to have a smaller containment design. The pressure suppression technology enables the Mark I to reduce the pressure in the containment vessel by condensing steam in the suppression pool. Safety remained our top priority, and the Mark I design met all NRC design criteria.

Claim: Modifications made to the Mark I over the last decades were driven by threats of lawsuits from utilities over alleged flaws in the system.

Fact: The Mark I containment designs were modified in the 1980’s to address improvements in the technology and changing regulatory requirements. All of these changes required by regulatory authorities have been implemented. The changes resulted from operational experience and improvements in technology and had nothing to do with lawsuits.

Click to enlarge: This schematic shows a Mark I reactor.

Read our other updates on the nuclear energy situation in Japan:

* Update on disaster relief
* Modifications to the Mark I containment system
* Our March 16 update


This entry was posted in Japan, Mark I, Nuclear, Other, Stories. Bookmark the permalink.
  • Paul Lewis

    Thanks for posting additional information.

  • J.D. Monty

    Thank you for the information on how the Mark 1 containment system works. I’m sure it is a technical marvel and the work of many engineering and test hours, and until last week it looked like a great system. We now have “Captain Hindsight’s” input into the matter and it would seem to say the following:

    The last line of defense containment measure against a catastrophe is not the place for the concepts of steamlined, compact, efficent and lightweight innovative design. Brute force, impenetrable, and Fort Knox are more the concepts that should apply. Having been inside the containment structure at the Seabrook nuclear plant, I would say that the latter set of concepts apply to that structure. This plant uses the traditional domed structure, of which the visible part is the tip of the iceberg. The remainder is a pit bored into solid granite bedrock. The dome itself is several feet of concrete reinforced with criscrossed 3″ rebar. There is an additional inner dome providing another layer of defense. While this event teaches us that nothing is 100% foolproof, I know which system I would bet on for containing a total reactor meltdown the longest.

    The steam suppression system in the Mark 1 appears to be effective only against a transient steam release event unless active cooling is provided for the quenching pool, which is obviously not there in this incident. The sustained heat load and steam release of this event would render the quenching system ineffective in a matter of hours, and apparently has. With the fuel assembly having months worth of decay heat to get rid of, a sustained heat and steam load has to be assumed in the event of a serious failure of the core vessel, for which the containment is presumably designed. The complex shape of the structure provides many more potential failure points in the event of an overpressure event or hydrogen explosion. If this event teaches us anything, it is that the last ditch emergency systems have to be totally passive and hold things in a safe condition indefinitiely with no operator intervention or outside power supply. This means brute force containment. I think that going forward, systems like the Mark I will be hard to justify in light of this incident.

  • William C.

    I would tend to agree….only the structural integrity of a Brute Force Type Containment vessel can be realized as the real solution ……when all else fails…it is the vessels ability to contain the fuel……and keep it there safely…regardless of external failures……you would think science and technology could achieve this….and maybe they can…….

  • Al LeBlang

    My previous message got sent before I had completed it.

    I worked with Yoshi Fujimori San of GE Japan in 1980 to 1990 at GEYMS.

    Please forward my email to him. Or give me his email.

    “Fujimori San please take care and stay well. Drop me an email if you have time.

    Your Buddy, Al “

  • jay Grandy

    So far it appears the only issue at Fukushima relates to the spent fuel pool which is outside the Mark I containment system.
    Lets save our preaching until we some evidence that the containment system has not done its job. The explosions appear to be in the reactor building and relate to spent fuel.

  • Ed Dykes

    The previous post is misleading about nuclear containments and the Mark I GE containment.

    First, a PWR style containment is not suitable for a boiling water reactor (BWR). The reason for this is that a BWR is a direct cycle nuclear plant compared to the indirect cycle employed by PWRs.

    When certain operational transients occur, such as a load rejection at 100% power, pressure rises rapidly in the reactor vessel and must be relieved. In the case of a BWR, the steam going to the turbine is slightly radioactive (this statement dicounts the effect of gamma radiation from Nitrogen-16 (N16) entrained in the steam flow, which has only a 6 second half life and consequently dies off exceedingly quickly).

    When the BWR RPV relief valves lift, the steam goes to the pressure suppression chamber filled with water. The water condenses the steam and scrubs radionuclides out of the steam. The scubbing effect of the pressure suppression chamber (the Torus in the Mark I containment) is extremely effective, typically removing 99.9% of all radionuclides that are not gases. In a Mark I containment, people working in the reactor building are not subjected to radionuclides when these events occur.

    If the containment were like the Seabrook containment, exposing workers to radionuclides would occur periodically when the aforementioned operational transients occur. I don’t think that you would like that to happen.

    PWRs are safe, and the Seabrook containment is a very good one, so don’t misinterprete what I am saying next. In most severe accident situations, the BWR Mark I and Mark II containments are excellent because (1) the suppression pool scubs out and holds the radionuclides that are not gases (2) alows access to all of the equipment in the reactor building without exposing personnel to extremely dangerous environmental conditions. The access to equipment is very important when trying to manually operate things or fix equipment that does not want to work.

    A GE BWR operates at very low pressures. The highest operating pressure is the main steam lines at about 1025 psig. There are an incredibly large number of ways to pump water into a BWR RPV. When it comes to accidents, personally I would much rather work under accident conditions with a Mark I or Mark II containment than a PWR containment.

    The Mark I and Mark II containments are “inerted” with Nitrogen during operations as well. Nitrogen is put in to displace the oxygen atmosphere so that there is no oxygen to support combustion, which is a very nice safety feature. These containments do not allow human access during normal operations and no access is needed. However, PWR containments must have access during normal operations because everything is inside of the primary containment! For example, normal work up on the refueling floor and on lots of equipment is inside of the containment so inerting is not an option.

    Remember that PWRs have a primary system at 2200 psig and more plus all of the energy in the water that is in the steam generators. They have to have a big containment to contain all of that energy under the worst accident conditions. Inspite of all of this stored energy, PWRs have small RRVs and thus only a small water inventory in their RPVs as well.

    GE deserves a lot of credit for the design of the BWR. Had the Japanese installed hardened vents for their Mark I containments as GE and the US NRC recommended, the hydrogen explosions in Japan would not have occurred. Even then, the containments have and continue to perform very well. The accident mitigation design, including the steam driven RCIC system, is well thought out. GE deserves a lot of credit for good engineering.

  • John

    It seems all the comments here are strictly in agreement with the GE point of view. If you won’t approve any dissenting points of view, what is the point of asking for comments in the first place?

  • Rick Marchant

    While I think it can be argued that there are positive aspects of both BWR and PWR designs (lower operating pressures versus contamination free secondary side) the nuclear safety track record over the last 50 years in the “free world” cannot be ignored. The only reason we are having this discussion centers strictly on the magnitude of the earthquake that hit Japan. Loss of redundant emergency cooling in either design could and would lead to major operational and safety issues. I would think we can all agree that nuclear power has been and will continue to be a tremendous success story as we move further into this century. While this tragedy leads in my mind to Monday morning quarterbacking by the press and others the real issues of importance are raised in comments like those of Al LeBlang above….

  • Don Kahlson

    On 3-14-11 PBS News Hour science correspondent Miles O’Brian said: “one important point which I should tell everybody is that the diesel fuel tanks for the auxiliary generators which keep the water pumping are all buried here in the United States. These tanks were above ground, for reasons that a lot of engineers can’t fully understand.”

    On 3-28-11 Time Magazine (pg 36) wrote: “simply because the region flooded didn’t mean the diesel-powered generators had to be swamped. Situating them above the waterline could have kept them running. But since the designers assumed the seawall would be sufficient, they put the diesels on the ground floor of the plant—The plant was supposed to have redundant systems to prevent this—but if you have four diesels on site and they can all be wiped out at once, that’s not real redundancy.”

    These reports leave the public to wonder whether the tanks, the generators, or both were above water, an issue that was hardly clarified when the New York Times wrote: “So far, the all-important lesson would seem to be: have sufficient emergency power at hand to keep cooling water circulating in the reactors to prevent a meltdown. The Japanese reactors seem to have survived one of the most powerful earthquakes ever recorded without major structural damage. The crisis developed because the plant lost electrical power from the grid and the tsunami knocked out its backup diesel generators. American regulators must ensure that all nuclear plants have enough mobile generators or other backup power in place if their first two lines of defense are disabled.” NYT Editorial March 17, 2011

  • Chris Sambuco

    I am able to find a copy of Dr. Stephen Hanauer’s 1972 memo regarding his opinion on the BWR containment design. However, I was unable to discover any information on the NRC investigation (1972 – 1980) and subsequent conclusion that the pressure suppression concept for the containment design is safe. I am interested in viewing the NRC official statement. Can you provide this information?

  • Nickolas K. Stolzer

    Could pipes be constructed with the outside of building to center of spent fuel pool measurements from blue prints. The height of the back or vertical piece about distance from top remaining steel to about three feet above ground or next surface that is accessable. Shaped like a upside down candy cain or spigot. With lifting eyes on top section of pipe at either elbow. The outside or ground end should be fitted with a flange and butter fly valve. Have these flown in to place and released with cable connected to outlet elbow lifting eye and dropped on other side of building and secured when safe. Connect hoses and pump Water to pool. It would put a large quanity of water to spot need mosted. I would hope 6 or 8 inch pipe would be enough or metric equal. This could be applied to reactors if they are open or at least to flood the Cavity. Three elbows, one flange and the correct amount of pipe, and some plate steel. Could be anywhere of site. One set for each building. This would be much more productive and sustainable then spraying. I know this could be overlly simple but maybe an engineer could look at.

    Once set up it could left alone and monitored by camera.
    Good Luck Those people are in a lot of peoples thoughts.

    Thank You

    Nick

  • Sharma SK

    Dear GE engineers,
    Can you please tell that Fukushima nuclear plants were having ‘Emengency condenser/Isolation condenser’ or not for passive core cooling? It appears that they were not having this facility. Earlier version of BWR like BWR-1 was having this system with 8 hours of cooling capacity. Why this excellent system was removed in subsequent versions? Had this system been in place,core cooling would have continued by just replenishing the shell side water with fire water using fire tender/fire hose or by any diesel driven pump. Also for sea side located plants, emergency diesel generators shoud be installed at 2nd floor of the building like turbine-generators are installed at 2nd or higher floor of the buidibg. It will improve availability of class-III power supply.
    One more thing I want to know that while drywell was vented to atmosphere to relieve pressure then why hydrogen explosion took place inside the reactor buiding? How hydrogen is getting concentrated inside the reactor buiding?

    Thank you,
    Sharma SK

  • Sharma SK

    Dear Mr. Ed Dykes,
    Can you please explain what is this hardened vent system is? you mentioned it in your comment. How is it different from the normal ventilation exhaust duct from suppression pool? What is the material of the hardened vent system? Is this vent header is designed to withstand Hydrogen explosion? Normally venting is done to outside of the building then why hydrogen got accumulated in reactor building? Does Fukushima plant has any passive core cooling system like Emergency condenser/Isolation condenser or not? From your comments it appears that you have fair idea of what happened in Fukushima. Pl. share it with us.
    Thanks & regards.
    Sharma SK

  • Abe Kohen

    I have no comment on Mark-I nor Mark-II containments, as I was a fuels guy way back when, but I am concerned about the high levels of the most dangerous isotopes being produced at Fulushima-I, aka Daiichi. Where can one see the levels of Cesium-137 and Strontium-90 at Fukushima-I and at 20 km radial distances outward? My prayers go out to all the dedicated hard workers at Fukushima and to their families who are creating a debt that Japanese society will never be able to repay to those modern kamikazes.

    Best,
    Abe Kohen
    ex GE Nuclear, SJ, CA 1980-1985

  • J.

    Looks like the standards need to be raised a bit…

    Is this an example of doing it the cheap way at the expense of humanity?…

    Is this true?

    VIA Carol Costello of CNN
    General Electric made $14.2 billion last year and paid no federal taxes, say the New York Times this morning: They mixed “fierce lobbying for tax breaks and innovative accounting that enables it to concentrate its profits offshore.”

    I hope some of those profits have been used for contingencies in your stellar safety designs, in the event of catastrophic failures.

  • Aladar Stolmar

    „It is a much overdue duty of NRC and IAEA to evaluate the evidence provided by the TMI-2 accident, Chernobyl-4 accident, Paks-2 incident, and related experiments. Evaluating this evidence, one can see that the ignition of the zirconium fire in the steam occurs at a local temperature of the fuel cladding of around 1000-1200′C, [[and that a self-feeding with steam due to the precipitation of eroded fuel pellets and zirconia reaction product from the hydrogen stream into the water pool, causes intense evaporation.]]
    There are insignificant differences in the progression of the firestorms that occurred in the TMI-2 reactor severe accident, Paks washing vessel incident, and Chernobyl-4 reactor accident; the later defined only by the amount of zirconium available for the reaction. At the mean time, there are significant similarities in the processes leading to the ignition of the firestorm. In all three of the compared cases, it took several hours of ill-fated actions or in-actions of the operators to cause the ignition condition. Also, there are similarities in the end result of the firestorm; namely, that the extent of the fuel damage is much less than it was predicted from any other severe fuel damage causing scenarios, introduced for explanations. Therefore the fraction of released fission products is significantly less than was anticipated from the fuel melting or a so called “steam explosion” scenario. Also, the fiery steam-zirconium reaction results in a much higher than anticipated (from any other scenarios) rate of Hydrogen production, which in turn requires a review of containment designs.”
    http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1033/ML103340250.pdf

    In light of the Fukushima Daiichi…

  • Ed Dykes

    Dear Sharma SK:

    An example of a hardened vent is a rifle. If the metal wall thickness of a pipe is sufficient, it will contain an explosion. In a containment hardened vent, the piping is selected with sufficient wall thickness in relation to its volume per unit length to contain the maximum possible hydrogen explosion. Knowing the pipe volume and maximum initial pressure, it is a simple matter to determine the proportions of hydrogen and oxygen in the pipe tha would give the biggest “bang”. From the this, the peak pressure is determined and the necessary pipe wall thickness calculated. Naturally, the greater the diameter of the pipe, the greater the necessary wall thickness. This hardened vent then goes to a HEPA filter, which under normal conditions will retain radionuclides that are not gases. The gas stream then goes to the plant stack and up into the atmosphere. The hardened vent system prevents any hydrogen generated to damage the secondary containment (reactor building). The material of a hardened vent may be either carbon steel or or stainless steel.

    If vent lines are not hardened, they may leak due to an event such as an earthquake or an explosion inside of them. This results in the gas stream going into the secondary containment (reactor building) instead of up the stack. If the hydrogen and oxygen concentrations are in the explosive range, any spark will detonate the mixture.

    I believe that the oldest reactor, the number 1 unit, which is a BWR/3 model with a Mark I containment has a separate isolation condenser. It is an early BWR/3 similar to Dresden Units 2 and 3 in Illinois, which have isolation condensers. The isolation condenser should have prevented the problems observed, so it is a mystery concerning exactly what happened. It has been suggested that Unit 1 experienced a small LOCA due to the earthquake that rendered the isolation condenser unusable. We will find out when the communications improve. The beauty of an isolation condenser is that water in a pool at atmospheric pressure does the cooling (pure water boiling off at 100 degrees C into the atmosphere) and gravity flow circulates the water on the reactor side of the condenser back to the reactor pressure vessel. All that has to be done is periodically put more water into the isolation condenser pool using a fire hose.

    It is interesting that the latest BWR designs, which are yet to be built anywhere, including the ESBR, use isolation condensers. “What is old is new again.”

    Therefore we see that the old plant, the Number 1 plant was particularly well designed for a loss of all AC power event. Unfortunately, the loss of all AC power event was caused by an extremely large earthquake and a tsumani of immense proportions damaging multiple systems and components. The single most serious issue was the common mode failure due to flooding all of the diesels and wiping out the supply of diesel fuel. As this unfolds, we will learn, why it took so long to get water to the plants. It was the United States Navy that delivered two barges with 60,000 gallons of freshwater a week after the event. There is a dock right there at the plant.

  • Sharma SK

    Dear Mr.Ed Dykes,
    Thank you for your reply. I was waiting for it. You mentioned correctly that Fukushima Unit No. 1 has isolation condenser. Isolaton condenser helps in mitigating pressure transients and cooling the reactor but it will not help much in maintining reactor water level. Reactor water level will go down at a rate depending upon primary system leak and rate of cooling/depressurisation. Reactor core will uncover in approximately 4 to 8 hours depending upon primary system leak. Thus isolation condenser will give only this much time and within this period, water injection to core has to be established. Due to station black out, coolant injection was not possible and it resulted in core uncovering and damage.
    Hardened vent system was introuced to Mark-1 containments in USA plants after USNRC recommendation. Can you please mail me copy of this recommendation and copy of the ‘USNRC guidelines for severe accident management’. I will be very greatful to you.
    My e-mail ID is: [Address Redacted]
    Thanks & regards.
    Sharma SK

  • Ed Dykes

    Sharma SK:

    GE deleted your email address. I am not associated with the General Electric Company in any way, so I have no way to get your address. You can get most information directly from the NRC website. Go to “www.nrc.gov”. The United States NRC does an excellent job making information available to the public. Insofar as I know, the hardened vent was developed and installed by the Pilgrim Plant in Massachusetts. I am told that communications discussing the hardened vent were sent out to all plants world wide by GE. The NRC subsequently sent out communications to all United States plants that included the Pilgrim design for their reference and recommended that everyone look into it for their plant.

  • Frits Bogtstra

    When a LOCA occurs in a BWR with temperatures in the reactor rising to above 1200 °C steam and hydrogen fill up the primary containment. Having reached enough pressure, the steam and hydrogen will be pressed through the pressure suppression chamber where the steam condenses, but not the hydrogen. The hydrogen then enters the secondary containment which, for the Mark I and the Mark II containment is not designed to withstand higher pressures. Together with the oxygen present in the air the hydrogen explodes and the building is ruptured as happened in Fukushima. So in my opinion the Mark I and the Mark II containments are not suited for a nuclear reactor.
    Frits Bogtstra,
    April 3, 2011.

  • Ed Dykes

    Frits:

    Your comment applies to any containment. Just delete the part about a suppression pool, and you have a PWR containment, although PWRs have what is known as the emergency sump that fulfills some of the functions of the suppression pool.

    Interestingly, Mark I and Mark II containments operate inerted, i.e. with a Nitrogen atmosphere inside the containment. Therefore, there is almost no oxygen present to react with hydrogen and blow up the containment.

    Guess what? Other containment designs, such as for PWRs and the Mark III for BWRs are not inerted and have plenty of oxygen to react with the hydrogen and cause explosions inside of the containment. Why aren’t these other containments inerted? It is becase people have to access the equipment inside of them during normal operations. These other containments have systems inside that are designed to ignite hydrogen in small quantities before it can build up in big quantities.

    Ah, you say, what if the hydrogen igniters fail to work? Hmmm. The Mark I and Mark II containments start looking kind of nice, don’t they?

    For any containment, there must be provision for safe venting as a precaution for very severe scenarios, such as a 9.0 earthquake followed by a 14 meter tsunami. By safe venting, I mean piping designed so that the hydrogen and other gases are carried off so that it is effectively impossible to damage either the primary containment or the secondary containment during the venting process..

  • Frits Bogtstra

    Drear Ed,
    True, the primary containment is inerted. I am talking about an explosion in the secondary containment. If the mark I containment (when I am speaking of containment I mean primary and secondary containment) is as good as you describe, why did nr 1 and nr 3 Daiichi containments explode? It is also interesting to note that at TMR and at Fukushima there was a LOCA situation, but in fact at TMR nothing serious happened contrary to Fukushima. By the way, I don’t think 9.0 earthquake and 14 meter tsunami is connected to the problem I am addressing.
    And I think you are right If Mark I is fitted with piping so that hydrogen can be vented from the primary containment to the outside atmosphere it would be a lot better. But I think this was not the case at Fukushima.

  • Ed Dykes

    Frits:

    If hydrogen gets into any secondary containment, PWR or BWR, at a concentration greater than 4% and there is an ignition source present, it will explode. This is also true for any industrial plant, nuclear or not. In th case of nuclear plants, the secondary containments are closed with limited exhausts and if you stream a lot of hydrogen into them, it builds up. Because the Japanese plants had lost all AC power, none of the exhaust fans would have been in operation. There was just no place for hydrogen to go except up to the top because it is the lightest gas.

    The explosions at Fukushima are apparently due to the lack of of hardened vents going to the plant stacks. In the case of the reactors that experienced hydrogen explosions, the vent path ductwork was either not hardened and damaged by the earthquake or the vent path was venting into the secondary containment.

  • Frits Bogtstra

    Dear Ed,
    Possibly a lack in my knowledge, so please help me. I don’t understand why the vent piping should be hardened (or I don’t understand what you mean by hardening).

  • Ed Dykes

    Frits:

    I had explained it before in a note to Sharma. After reading the repeat below, look up through the communications for more.

    An example of a hardened vent is a rifle. If the metal wall thickness of a pipe is sufficient, it will contain an explosion. In a containment hardened vent, the piping is selected with sufficient wall thickness in relation to its volume per unit length to contain the maximum possible hydrogen explosion. Knowing the pipe volume and maximum initial pressure, it is a simple matter to determine the proportions of hydrogen and oxygen in the pipe tha would give the biggest “bang”. From the this, the peak pressure is determined and the necessary pipe wall thickness calculated. Naturally, the greater the diameter of the pipe, the greater the necessary wall thickness. This hardened vent then goes to a HEPA filter, which under normal conditions will retain radionuclides that are not gases. The gas stream then goes to the plant stack and up into the atmosphere. The hardened vent system prevents any hydrogen generated to damage the secondary containment (reactor building). The material of a hardened vent may be either carbon steel or or stainless steel.

  • sharma SK

    Dear GE Engineers,
    I studied your latest BWR design in view of Fukushima incident from the document ‘The ESBWR Plant General Description’ by GE/Hitachi (183 page document). First I want to congratulate you for the excellent design. This design is safer but not fools proof. Your claim is that emergency cooling systems are totally passive but at most they can be called semi-passive only, as their operation is dependant on DC supply. If DC supply is lost, your emergency cooling and depressurization systems will fail miserably and it can be catastrophic in an emergency situation. There is a fair chance of failure of DC supply as safety related battery banks (Class-1E grade batteries) are housed below grade (ground) level in reactor building. Not only battery bank but electrical penetration to primary containment is also below grade level. I understand that battery room doors are water-tight but the doors may get damaged in earthquake/tornado or any other natural disaster and they may not remain water-tight. Water may enter through the doors and it may incapacitate battery banks. No one can guaranty that doors will remain water tight after a severe natural disaster. Loss of DC supply is like station blackout in your case. Actually in this design you have shifted function of EDG (class-III supply) to battery bank (class-I supply) and most of the emergency systems operation (except for isolation condenser) are dependant on it like operation of explosive squib valves, control circuits etc. Fukushima incident has proved that keeping emergency supply systems (EDG, battery bank etc) on grade level or below grade level is not a prudent design. In view of this I suggest you to please relocate your safety related DC batteries and their related systems above grade level so that they may not get flooded in tsunami/tornado/hurricane/heavy rain or in any other natural disaster. You are having time to make changes in plant configuration as this design is still in licensing process and has not been approved yet. You may still say that your design is safe but please remember that before 11/3/11, Japanese were also saying the same.
    Thank you.
    Sharma SK

  • Frits Bogtstra

    Dear Ed,
    On 20th march you wrote that the hardened steel vent was recommended by U.S.NRC and GE. This means that it did not belong to the standard equipment, it was optional. I tend to agree with you that the Mark I containment is an excellent containment with the vent. But how it is possible to sell the BWR without it is hardly understandable to me.

  • Ed Dykes

    Frits:

    With any technology there are lessons learned with experience. I do not think that any Mark I containment originally had hardened vents. In the 1960s and 1970s it is likely that this design feature was not considered necessary because an event where they would protect the plant was considered remote.

    When Three Mile Island occurred, it was an eye opener to see how a plant with emergency systems functioning perfectly could be destroyed due to a sequence of operator errors, one after the other. Suddenly bizarre events did not seem as remote anymore. There was a lot of hydrogen gas evolved at Three Mile Island that led to a lot of design changes in all reactors.

    “But how it is possilbe to sell …without it is hardly understandable …” is a statement that can be applied to all industiies. For example, how is it understandable that coal fired plants are sold without scubbing all of the mercury and all of the radioacitve gases and all of the sulphur compounds and all of the carbon dioxide?

    How is it understandable that automobiles are allowed when they kill 35,000 people a year and maim over 100,000 for life just in the USA alone?

    Union Carbide killed more than 16,000 people in a chemical plant accident in India. How is it understandable that similar chemical plants are allowed to operate in the USA?

    The good news about nuclear power is that it is much more of a financial risk to its owners than it is a health risk to people. You will observe that not one person has died in Japan to date due to exposure to radiation from the Fukushima plant even though it is at least the second worst nuclear accident in history.

    A more appropriate question is why did the owners of the plant not apply the lessons learned from the other nuclear incidents? Three Mile Island was a PWR, but there were still many lessons for BWRs, including concerns about hydrogen. There were more than 30 years from the time of Three Mile Island to the Fukushima incident for the owners — who hold the licenses to the plants and bear the risk — to make changes. If something about vents is incomprehensible, that is the thing that is difficult to understand. The plants in the USA made the changes.

  • Frits Bogtstra

    Dear Ed,
    I agree with the question you pose why the owners of the Fukushima plant did not learn from previous accidents, although the hydrogen release was already described in the Rasmussen report (Wash 1400) in 1974. But there is another interesting issue here. Why did General Electric not tell the Fukushima owners to apply the latest technology to their equipment. At the end of the day GE and the likes have a lot to lose from accidents like the one in Fukushima. I feel a mechanism should be developed by which suppliers of nuclear equipment can (and should) compel their purchasers to apply the latest technology concerning safety. Of course the suppliers of nuclear equipment should have complete inventories of the equipment they delivered.

  • Curt Markley

    I agree with Ed regarding his response to “But how it is possilbe to sell …without it is hardly understandable …” More analogies – how was it possible to sell cars without seat belts and air bags? How was it possible to wire houses without ground protection? How was it possible to sell cars without anti-lock braking systems? People learn ways to improve, and include the improvements in subsequent designs.
    No plants are designed for every conceivable problem. But, USA plants are well designed for anticipated problems, and many problems that will likely never occur.
    The significant oversight at Fukushima was not identifying a single event that disabled all offsite and onsite power for extended periods. That event was beyond the design basis of the station.

  • Tim

    I cannot believe that people, no matter how negative towards Nuclear Energy, would actually believe GE would put out a product that was not fully tested not only by their own Engineers but also the regulatory commission. GE is not in it for the “fast buck”, you do not build a business on sell cheap forget about the consequences. GE has been around for over a hundred years for a reason. I am not saying they are perfect, show me one company that is. They put out the best product they can based on the requirements at the time of manufacture. After the sale, all GE can do is recommend to do upgrades as technology improves. From what I have read on this matter, the opportunity to upgrade the system was offered and rejected. The fact that it took one of the most powerful earthquakes and a Tsunami twice the size as the plant was designed for and avoided a total melt down should to some degree be applauded. Lets not point fingers and say “you should have done this”, let’s focus on what can we do to insure this does not happen again. This is as it has been for all of mankind since the birth of the industrial revolution. We learn and we adapt.

    And may I just say that this talk about GE not paying taxes is purely based on knowing only one side of the story, shame on you loud mouths for spewing such false information based on half-truths. Remember the crash in 2008 / 2009 of the financial institutions? Like everyone else out there, to include small and large business, when we report a loss during a tax year, those losses are reported and written off of the next years taxes. Yes GE is a huge company that has huge sales, which is why they had such huge losses!

    So please, let’s think rationally and stop this insistent finger pointing, it does nobody any good, especially the victims of this horrific tragedy. Let’s recover, improve on a good design based on 40 year old technology, and make it better. Let’s focus on the job at hand and get Japan back on its feet!

    Regards

  • sto

    Nuclear reactor are dangerous, inherently.
    There is no containment that can withstand the most severe accident.
    The NRC declared that they cannot evaluate properly containment ! so why do you reference to them ?

    You announce . “40 year record of safety” : that’s too easy. Of course the containment does not fall down in 40 years of use. Fukushima was the first 3 times these containments (with improvements) had to withstand a severe accident. 3/3 failed to contain. 100% failure.

  • L Dawa

    If the GE Mark I was in stead an aircraft that permanently displaced 80,000 people and rendered a 30km or larger circle uninhabitable, ruined a massive amount of farmland too toxic to farm and destroyed tens of millions of people’s peace of mind, and forced children to stay indoors during recess, the aircraft would be permanently grounded. Fact: the Concord killed a few hundred and all planes were grounded for safety. Far more than this will get sick and die prematurely due to the increased radioactive load on their tissues and fragile DNA. History proved this in the Ukraine and it will be proven in Japan as well.

    Three plants violently exploded, spreading spent fuel over a mile away, and reports inform us the corium location and status is not known or is known but not reported to date. ANY engineer knows this does not meet any design safety criteria. The design failed. Period. Forty years of good performance is not good enough when it ends in explosion and a triple meltdown. Sadly, these plants did what they were designed to do when all power is lost.

    GE should be horrified for what it’s flawed design caused. It is indeed a marvel of engineering, and so was the Titanic.

  • Ivan

    @ Tim

    Oh Tim…
    “GE has been around for over a hundred years for a reason. I am not saying they are perfect, show me one company that is. They put out the best product they can based on the requirements at the time of manufacture”

    They also have enough money to pay people like you to leave great comments.
    :)

    Regards

  • chy12

    It’s clear by the sheer volume of items in Infinitely Kusama that Vuitton exp.Louis Vuitton Outlet Store Purese this assortment to be successful within the vein of past collaborations with Stephen Sprouse and Takashi Murakami. the corporate allowed her to speckle nearly each variety of piece that it makes, as well as a extremely fun look ahead to ad campaigns! Twice a year, brands roll out pictures meant to sell their ideas of their collections to the general public, and since purses and accessories are therefore critically vital to the monetary wellbeing o.

  • acmavm

    You can’t believe? Corporate America, every damn last company, business, or firm follow the Larry, Darryl, & Darryl business model of anything for a buck. If they can save a few bucks they’ll cut ANY corner.