The Mark I Containment System in BWR Reactors

March 16, 2011

While events are still unfolding on the ground at the damaged Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant, GE continues to provide technical assistance to TEPCO through our joint venture partners in Japan and to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which is in turn providing assistance to the Japanese government. There are also some facts that GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy can attempt to clarify, such as those concerning the Mark I containment system in use at the reactors in the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant.

The Mark I containment has a proven track record of safety and reliability for over 40 years and there are 32 BWR Mark I reactors operating as designed worldwide.

While the technology was commercialized 40 years ago, it has continued to evolve. Over the last four decades, the Mark I has been modified in the form of retrofits to address technology improvements and changing regulatory requirements.

All of the modifications were made in accordance with regulatory requirements. In the United States, for example, the NRC issued a generic industry requirement in 1980 for the Mark I containment that the industry used to make modifications.

We understand that all of the BWR Mark I containment units at Fukushima Daiichi also addressed these issues and implemented modifications in accordance with Japanese regulatory requirements.

The modifications made to Mark I containments include:

  • “Quenchers” were installed to distribute the steam bubbles in order to produce rapid condensation and to reduce loads on the unit. In a reactor, exhaust steam is piped into a suppression chamber, which is known as the torus and is a large, rounded suppression pool that sits next to the reactor core. It is used to remove heat when large quantities of steam are released from the reactor. In the torus, the steam bubbles go under water. With the modification to the Mark I, the quenchers, which are also underwater, make steam bubbles smaller by breaking up the larger bubbles. This in turn reduces pressure.
  • Another modification is the installation of deflectors inside the torus. When that steam goes in, the water level rises. The deflectors that were added break up the pressure wave that is produced and help relieve pressure on the torus.
  • A further modification was made to the “saddles” on which the torus sits — basically the series of leg-like structures that support it. The construction was fortified, as was the steel, to accommodate the loads that are generated.

* Read “Setting the Record Straight on Mark I Containment”

A BWR reactor: The schematic above shows the torus at left, which is doughnut-shaped.

* Read our most recent update on the nuclear energy situation in Japan


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  • Jennifer

    Dear GE Engineers,
    I read the interesting articles posted on your website. It is reassuring to know how long GE has been in the nuclear energy business. Please comment on the following article which appeared in today’s Washington Post.

    The operator of Japan’s Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear power plant says a fire has broken out again at its No. 4 reactor unit. It says the blaze erupted early Wednesday in the outer housing of the reactor’s containment vessel. (March 15)

    The articles on GE’s website do not provide a technical analysis of why fires continue to erupt at the Fukushima power plant.

    (The difficulty at the Fukushima plant reminds me of the tremendous problems faced by BP engineers during the oil pipeline leak on the Gulf Coast.)
    Thank you. Jennifer

  • Mark

    Hi Jennifer. I don’t work for GE, but a number of different engineering firms contributed to the design of the original plant. GE worked on the Mark I containment but may not have contributed to the building that housed the containment vessel.

    A better source for that information might be the utility- TEPCO.

  • Jim

    I appreciate the information provided in the previous article. However, one of the key things for us to understand, of course, is ‘could this happen here?’ And while I understand a Tsunami and Earthquake off the charts is unlikely, there are other things that obviously didn’t go as planned.

    My specific question is this: Did Japan institute the same hardened vent pipe (direct vent) modification after TMI that our U.S. plants did following NRC mandate? The reason I ask should be obvious to those familiar with these designs. A similar US design where a hydrogen filled environment exists in the containment should NOT cause an explosion in the Reactor Building. It should be neatly vented out the direct vent protected by the hardened pipe. If we did not have this hardened pipe, it would be hard to disagree that we are susceptible as well.

    In other words, if the US successfully predicted that hydrogen explosions are possible, could be avoided with this modification, and then implemented this modification – I think it goes a long way to say that the same event at a US plant (even with the Tsunami and 9.0 earthquake) would not have resulted in the catastrophe that continues to unfold that was ultimately compounded by the hydrogen explosions.

    Thank you for your time. I have searched all over and cannot find an answer to know if Japan took the time and money to invest in this same modification as we did.

  • Bill

    It is recognized that GE may not want to answer the following questions for not wanting to make excuses or from the other direction not wanting to admit to a design fault, but I think it would be instructive to know: 1) What was the Richter scale equivalent for the seismic plant design requirements compared to the 9.0 experienced? and 2 What was the size of the Tsunami used in design compared to what was experienced? Hopefully, what was experienced far exceeded the design requirements. Also, it is important to realize that GE used design requirements provided by and/or accepted by TEPCO.

  • chris

    To Jennifer
    I dont think GE is responsible for a fire at a plant….
    also as far as i understand the reactors are still pretty much intact – not bad for a 09 quake + tsunami and that’s what GE is making…strongly sealed reactors. (i dont work for ge..indeed)

  • koichi

    Dear GE nuclear engineering specialists.

    I’d like to ask you how far should we evacuate from Fukushima nuclear power plant(s) with over 1,000 nuclear fuel rods, when the worst case happens. I would appreciate it if you would post the worst case scenario on GE’s website immediately. We, who are living in Japan, need to know asap.

    Thank you in advance.
    Koichi

  • Smith

    Hi Jennifer,
    I am not an engineer so I won’t try and explain the details. However, the BBC website http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12726591 provides a good graphic description of why the fires are occuring in the reactors. Hope that helps a bit.

  • Albert

    You ask a good question Jennifer. I believe the 1st fire was attributed to being lubrication oil stored next to the waste cooling pool, after the water dropped low enough for the waste material to start to decompose and produce hydrogen gas that ignited the oil. Im not sure if the waste cooling pool is related to GE’s reactor design and since never being in that plant I cannot confirm the design. The plant i worked at here in the US the pool for waste rods are outside the containment shell, this room is normally keep pretty cool and comfortable temptures in the mid 60 to 70 deg Fahrenheit. one the reports before the fire said the pool there reached 84 degrees Celsius which is 170 degrees Fahrenheit. with the power out, the generators swamped with sea water, and the batteries drained the recirculating pumps apparently failed.

    I believe this is on the missions of the 180 workers is to get those working correctly, reactors 5 and 6 are suffering the same, but not as high yet… so they may have gotten them running again.

  • Haifeng

    Dear All,
    After reading all the comments, I think GE will be better, because we are discussing about the tech fault GE might take on GE’s website.
    So I think if GE can analysis the reason why the fire ocurred, and develop the new tech to avoid the same disaster, aothough it may not GE’s fault, GE will be a great company!
    Hope all people in Japan is safe, and GE can help all power plant to improve the safety.

  • Mathew Kurzius

    Not sure if this was considered but can TEPCO try fire boats to put water on the reactors? They throw a lot more water and a lot further than the methods that have been tried so far.

  • allen

    I think I can help you cool down your mark 1 reactor ( rods ).
    The problem is I take it is you having problems cooling of the rods, the problem is that the rods are too hot and the water is not cold enough to cool down the rods, so once it hits the rods, the water instantly turns into steam, so no matter what you do it will never cool down because the water will evaporate once you add more water.
    One solution to this problem is to increase the water pressure so it will be harder for the rods to heat up the water ether from the systems you have in place or by water hose this should start to cool down the rods
    Another way you could do if you could find enough dry ice or liquid nitrogen is poor this over the rods to cool them down just enough so you could use water getting to the rods to do this would be hard for any human to due which a person would need both a hazard suit and a fire suit on,even so they probably wouldn’t survive. Honda motors has a robot asimo that might help.

  • Richard

    Can a tsunami clog/damage feed water pumps? If so, what would happen?

  • Winston

    Since it was the NRC that required it, was the “direct torus vent system” safety modification done on all GE Mark I reactors worldwide or just those in the US since that’s the only nation where the NRC has authority?

    It has been reported that one of the Fukushima reactors had a hydrogen explosion in its torus (#2 I believe). When the unit #3 building blew up, the debris pattern was far different from a previous explosion in another building. There was a very heavy cylindrical plume of debris that was projected at least 300 feet into the air. This would probably be a characteristic of an entire torus exploding with an inward directed converging wave meeting at its center and projecting debris in a column upward. Could an entire torus explode from H2 buildup or overpressure?

  • Tom Clements

    So, you are saying that all the modifications GE made to the Mark I design did not help prevent the accidents at the multiple Fukushima Daiichi units?

    Also, I find it surprising that the statement above did not affirm that GE will be conducting an analysis of the safety of Mark I reactors worldwide – will you conduct such an analysis?

    I am aware of the memos from the Atomic Energy Commission in the early 1970s which warned about the risk of the GE Mark I design and I am wondering do you think those memos were prescient?

  • Hoim Moonn

    Dear,

    I want to know the thickness of primary and secondary containment vessls(concrete and steel liner).

  • David

    For the life of me I am not understanding why robotics are not being used in place of these brave men trying to cool down the damaged reactors. It would probably be ease enough to rig up construction equipment to clear a path to the reactors, and then in turn use robotic firefighting equipment to get at the water situation. This is a national and world event that is a catastrophe…whatever help being provided to Japan should really look at some innovated solutions!

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YzJg5fkFPtU

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CXvbBv5-9Bs

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7IhQ4teJqms&feature=related

  • AL

    HELICOPTERS OVERHEAD AT A HIGHER ALTITUTUDE,CONNECT PIPING 24′ CIRCUMFRENCE,DIRECT IT INTO REACTOR 4 THAT IS ALREADY OPEN AND DROP ICE INSTEAD OF TRYING TO GET WATER IN IT DOWN PIPEING,CAN CONTINUE CAUSE YOUR AT A HIGHER ELEVATION C’MON GUYS YOU CAN DO IT!!

  • Al

    Dear GE. How is it that presumed intellegent engineers can design and install diesel backup generators in the basement of plant facilities in a tsunami coastal zone? Also, I question whether the tsunami actually caused the backup generators not to work. Can you tell me (or anyone else) why YOUR diesel generators often fail to operate when tested at low speed and are euphamistically called “Snap, Crackle, and Pop” when operating at full generating capacity?
    This nuclear disaster reminds me of when the space shuttle blew up because it was launced in cold weather. NASA said “Wow, we didn’t anticipate that!” Then, when the next shuttle burned up on re-entry NASA said “Wow, we should have had a tile repair kit and took heat shield photos before re-entry”.
    If North America experiences intense solor flaires that knock out our electrical grid or terrorists clip the power lines… of the 104 reactors in this country, how many can we expect to melt down when your generators fail?

  • MHH

    Why not build peak demand plants on sites of nuclear plants to help insure adequate electricity for emergency uses.

  • Ed Dykes

    The diesels at the Fukushima site are not GE diesels. They are Japan sourced diesels.

    The owner of these plants is TEPCO, not GE. GE is a nuclear steam supply system and turbine system supplier, not a plant owner or Architect-Engineering firm. The GE supplied items worked well and proved robust.

    TEPCO and the Japanese regulatory authorities are responsible for the plant configurations and design bases as they exist today. It is many years since these plants were constructed.

    Concerning GE engineers, when the full story about the Fukushima nuclear plant problems is published, you will find that TEPCO did not make certain modifications although they were more than adequately informed by GE many years ago. In particular, the venting system, as was discussed in a previous posting at this website, was a major factor. Additionally, there are some significant human errors involved.

    The reluctance to release any radioacitve isotopes into the air, regardless of how benign, apparently led them to not vent early on and they waited until things had gone too far with substantial hydrogen generation that led to blowing the roofs off of the reactor buildings.

    A major unanswered question at this point is why they did not have water trucks going to the plant and filling up the condensate storage tank so that the RCIC system could keep going injecting cold water. Even with major devastation, the surface water sources still existed for filling up tankers.

    Note that in spite of all the abuse and a situation well beyond the design specifications, the containments are hanging in there doing what they are supposed to do.

  • Al

    @Ed Dykes

    I don’t believe the issue of refilling the CST would have made any difference.

    First, that portion of the system is not designed as safety-related, and consequently not designed with seismic criteria. The tank being outside, it is highly especulative that it could withstand the combined effect of quake+tsunami.

    The backup suction source is the suppression pool or torus. In a SBO its temperature can only go up, because the exhaust of the RCIC turbine goes there, even without considering additional safety/relief valves discharges. Just because of that temperature increase, the available NPSH will go down and the pump will end up cavitating and tripping.

    Another cause of RCIC inoperability is also related to the suppression pool, and is again its temperature: when it reaches saturation conditions, the backpressure in the turbine exhaust will be too high and it will trip.

    Thus, even if the batteries for I&C had been recharged or replaced (which may have been the case, since there were early reports that they were airlifted and the fact that some monitoring capabilities were maintained backs this assumption), it would have not mattered: RCIC was lost.

    Interestingly, Unit 1 which was a BWR/3 instead of BWR/4, had an Isolation Condenser. This only provides 1 hour autonomy without replenishing water to the secondary side, but the tank holding the heat exchanger is located in the Reactor Building and quite probably survived the quake+tsunami. If it had been possible to replenish water on time, this reactor would have weathered the storm really well, since none of the problems related to supression pool temperature increase would have affected it. This is quite ironic, being the oldest reactor.

    By a cruel twist of fate the 1-hour limit was almost exactly the time that the tsunami needed to reach the site, and the window of opportunity to replenish the secondary side was lost. Even at that time, if the reactor had been quickly depressurized and water injected via fire truck, the reactor could have been saved. In the aftermath of the tsunami, this was evidently impossible. Once this point was reached, there was no other way than core damage in a much faster fashion than the other reactors (that still had RCIC for around 8 hours). No surprise Unit 1 was the first to blow up.

  • David

    Liquid Nitrogen will cool the containment areas and the reactor. Carbon dioxide CO2 will put out the fires. It should be possible to introduce both in a liquid form into the buildings at the same time. Personell would then be able to enter the buildings wearing protective suits if the rad levels aren’t extraordinary.If not, US Laser guided weapons could be modified quickly to deliver CO2 bombs and Liquid Nitrogen bombs into the reactors. Or allow the meltdown to continue and then try to flood the buildings with the above. My question is this? What effect would using a small yield nuclear weapon have on the facility once everyone is evacuated to a safe distance. Would the Radiocactive fuel rods be completey consumed by introducing a level of heat high enough to destroy them…just a thought. Would the low yield bomb have a shoter half-life tan the current fuel?

  • Jack Goldmaker

    Could they not use a very large tanker aircraft like the Evergreen fleet of 747′s to drop a Boric acid/water mixture like fire retardant. Perhaps liquid Gadolinium air dropped with water. It would be necessary to blow the nearby towers, but one 747 could do a run on all reactors. The aircraft is pressurized and it will pass through the radiation at a higher speed than a helicopter. There are also the DC-10 fleets of fire fighting aircraft as well. 5 of these aircraft could probably drown the plant with a few sorties.

  • Al

    By the way, I’m not the same Al that commented before (should be evident but just for clarification)

  • Herbert J. Bernstein

    Dear Colleagues,

    I suggest that you encourage your customers to put specially engineered nuclear plant rated, vertical wind turbines along the lips of their cooling towers to extend the run time of their cooling and control system power backup systems. In addition to being the responsible, ecomagination thing to do, it might represent a new market for GE. Here’s the reasoning:

    With all due respect for the excellent engineering of the GE components of the TEPCO plant, somebody really does have to take an overall systems view to the full system built around these GE components and make sound engineering recommendations for best-practices use of those components. That does not mean that GE will suddenly have the ability to enforce those recommendations, but it might help those who do have enforcement responsibilities to make more sound decisions. I doubt that anyone now believes it to be a best practice, nor even a safe practice, to have only 8 hours of backup power for your cooling systems, or to site major safety components below the likely high water mark, or to site multiple reactors so close to one another that a failure of one reactor significantly impacts your ability to retain control of the others. It is long past time for the nuclear engineers at GE to exercise their ecomagination, do the full system fault trees and come up with a set of best practices recommendations that, if followed, will allow the remaining Mark I’s to finish their operating lives or be phased out without further major ecological impact and loss of life. To help get the process started in a creative direction, consider the possibility of GE designed, say, some ultra robust vertical wind turbines to be placed along the lips of all cooling towers to extend to run times of cooling and control system battery backups and to greatly reduce the outage periods. Similar things could be done integrating solar and thermal. To make the accountants happy, one could point out that this would represent a significant new market for GE, but no matter who ends up getting the actual contracts, it is still the right thing to do, the ethical thing for every engineer to do, to create a new, sound book of best practices for full systems designs making use of GE nuclear components.

    — HJB

  • Rumpelstiltskin

    Dear GE Engineer Types:

    How many curies of material in a Mark 1 reactor?

    thx

  • Dallas Tisdale

    In the CFR

    “Criterion 50– … § 50.44 energy from metal-water and other chemical reactions that may result from degradation but not total failure of emergency core cooling functioning,” Can be interpreted as not considering the total loss of cooling that appears to be experienced at Fukushima. Could you elaborate on the actual design basis of the GE Mark I, as modified?

  • Dallas Tisdale

    Pardon me, I did not include this in the last comment as it may not be a part of General Electric’s design responsibility.

    The Spent Fuel Storage Pools have a design basis for total loss of mechanical cooling and total loss of cooling water in the event of terrorist attack, etc. The design should allow for a minimum of 48 hours without make-up water for maximum decay heat (50% of cover water evaporation) and passive air cooling in the event of total water loss. SFSP design has been question by a number of nuclear engineers that current design does not allow for Zircaloy cladding oxidation which the NRC determined was invalid for dense packed storage rack design. Could you elaborate or provide a source able to address the probability of such an occurrence?

    Thank you,

    Dallas Tisdale

  • sonoran desrt stew

    Question? Can the molton urainium mass be deluted with lead or maybe mixed or alloyed to a higher melting point to better manage the radiation or is the graphite bed under the reactor enough to do the job?

  • sonoran desrt stew

    Understand that i know next to nothing about nuclear reactors and that it is probably just acooling problem. But i keep imagining a bubbling molten mass sinking to the middle of the earth!!

  • Thomas Oliver

    I am a retired U.S. naval officer. I have found emergency diesel generaors to be very relyable, starting first time every time. These generators might have done just fine if they had been in water-tight buildings equipped with world war two submarine-style snorkels. They would have shut down briefly when the wave swamped the air intake valves, but they would not have sucked in and choked on all of that sea water. This could have prevented the loss of cooling. The sad reality is that this and all such plats are cobbled together with equipment supplied by a variety of manufacturers in structures designed to withstand the worst case that the builders can afford to accomodate. Mother Nature just raised the ante.

  • Mark Mc

    How many other operating BWR’s in Japan have Mark 1 Cnmt’s??
    Do we know if Divisional separation or even Plant separation exists for the Japanese AC & DC systems? Is all AC & DC switchgear located on the same elevations?

  • John D

    To Ed Dykes:

    In all your wisdom and experience from working at G.E. Nuclear you should be offering solutions to the problem at hand not presenting defensives for the engineers or for a containment that still has a number of trials yet to prove its worthiness. While no one hopes you are wrong about the containment, no one cares if the Mark-x containments are “still doing what they are designed to do” today if they fail us tomorrow.

    You are also very correct that there are many unanswered questions but right the people of Japan and those truly concerned need “solutions” not defensive finger pointing.

    I suggest that you don’t wait for the answers, but get your team together and find solutions.

    John D

  • John

    I really can’t understand how this design could be so bad.

    1. All the post-accident cooling systems are active, not passive. Most other designs at least allow for passive cooling for a few days before electrical power is restored. In a CANDU reactor, for example, the reactor can be cooled, passively, for over 3-4 days, without ANY power source.

    2. Most Data Centres seem to have more redundancy in their electrical supply than these nuclear plants, despite the fact that the consequences of losing power in a BWR are utterly catastrophic. Condorcet in Paris, for example, has 8 diesel generators, and power-hookups so even if _all_eight_ fail, they can still hook up external, portable diesels. I can’t fathom why these systems were not better built.

    3. The Nuclear industry as a whole (and not just GE here), seems to have completely forgotten what to do about Nuclear waste. In general, Nuclear waste has been treated as an afterthought. I can’t understand why there is no containment provisions for spent fuel. That is bordering incompetence and possibly negligence.

    4. Why isn’t there any Boron or Gadolinium available, ONSITE, to inject into the reactor core in addition to help accelerate the SCRAM or help with the spent fuel pools? Did anyone make a contingency plan for a spent fuel pool being filled with fuel when an accident draining the water occurs?

    5. Other designs are able to supply water using Passive means (e.g. a gravity-fed water tank on-site). If this would have been available in Japan, we wouldn’t even have had an issue.

    It seems to me that the nuclear industry cannot survive any rational cost/benefit analysis after this accident. If the industry as a whole cannot address what appear to be relatively easy contingencies, then they lack the competence to continue. If the reason these safety measures have not been implemented is cost, then it is clear Nuclear energy is too costly to produce, and the money is better spent elsewhere, specifically on R&D on improving efficiencies in other forms of energy.

  • Stan

    Can someone comment on the relation between core damage and water level? If not, whee can I ask this?

    NISA posted, 11:00 March 15th, 2011, that “TEPCO evaluated that core damage of Unit 2 is “less than 5%” (22:14 March 14th).” See pgs 1 & 4 of
    http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/files/en20110316-2.pdf
    This was repeated by the IAEA DIrector General. See 3:00-3:30 min into the news briefing at
    http://www.youtube.com/user/iaeavideo#p/u/4/yZB8Br3T2Sk
    I’ve seen no other estimates of core damage.

    In the same NISA posting TEPCO reported (pg.3) reactor water levels in Dai-ichi units 1-3 to be from 1.4 to 2.3 m BELOW the top of the fuel at 11:42 March 15th. Dai-ni levels were reported (pg.5) to be about 7.6 to 8.5 m ABOVE the fuel. A March 20 posting includes units 5 & 6, at about 1.7m above the fuel. http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/files/en20110320-4-1.pdf

    Fuel rods are only about 4 m long If the water is 1.4 m below the top of the fuel, does it make sense for core damage to be less than 5%?

    TEPCO has a terrible record of false reports. Is this another case, or am I missing something?

  • Sharma SK

    Dear GE engineers,
    Can you please tell that Fukushima nuclear plants were having ‘Emengency condenser/Isolation condenser’ or not for passive core cooling? It appears that they were not having this facility. Earlier version of BWR like BWR-1 was having this system with 8 hours of cooling capacity. Why this excellent system was removed in subsequent versions? Had this system been in place,core cooling would have continued by just replenishing the shell side water with fire water using fire tender/fire hose or by any diesel driven pump. Also for sea side located plants, emergency diesel generators shoud be installed at 2nd floor of the building like turbine-generators are installed at 2nd or higher floor of the buidibg. It will improve availability of class-III power supply.
    Thank you,
    Sharma SK

  • Sharma SK

    Dear GE engineers,
    One more thing I want to know that while drywell was vented to atmosphere to relieve pressure then why hydrogen explosion took place inside the reactor buiding? How hydrogen is getting concentrated inside the reactor buiding?
    Thank you,
    Sharma SK

  • ere_Elba

    Isn’t there flammability gas control system in Mark 1 containment vessel ?

  • Sharma SK

    Dear Mr.Al,
    Are you sure that Unit-1 is having isolation condenser? If it is having the same then is its cooling capacity is only for 1 hour? Earlier version of BWR (BWR-1) is having emergency condenser with 8 hours of cooling capcity. What is difference between BWR-3 and BWR-4 design? Do all the units at Fukushima have RCIC system? Pl. eleborate.
    Thanks & regards.
    Sharma SK

  • Sam

    Hello, I am an engineering student currently and also have worked in the construction field for 2 years. For all who have never worked in construction needed to understand that for a plant that was built 40 YEARS AGO, that it did extremely well considering the size of the quake.

    REMEMBER the engineers first priority is make sure the people inside are not crushed by concrete and steel.

    Also remember that the diesel generators were hit by a wave which was powerful enough to destroy roads, bridges, houses, and buildings. For all who think you can water proof them, is a lot harder then it might seem to be, remember a commercial diesel back up generator is not only enormous but also creates massive amounts of heat. And for the batteries, well they’re batteries so they will die, there is no getting around that.
    As for GE’s reactors, they did their job, and a great one at that. Please realize that the actual design process started a few years before the reactors were even built, then add on a few more years to build them, then even more time to install them and do all the proper safety checks on them, plus the 40+ years that they have been in service, the reactors actual design are closer to 50+ years old and are still holding up to this natural disaster and continue to hold the bulk of the truly harmful radiation in. I think we need to thank the engineers who designed them. Remember that 50 years ago we didn’t know what we know now.

    ANYONE WHO HAS BLAMED THE ENGINEERS REALLY SHOULD APOLOGIZE ON HERE!
    If you find yourself asking “Why should I?,” then just try to imagine what society would be like without them, especially is your someone who is for the green movement, because where I live, I have a coal plant south of me and a nuclear plant north of me. After seeing both, trust me when I say the term “clean coal” is very vague. If you want to just complain to GE then complain to them to get rid of coal power and to invest more in nuclear, solar, and wind.

    I ask that everyone please remember if you want to spread blame, especially for a nuclear reactor that you think wasn’t designed properly, then you better be able to walk into GE with the full blueprints for one that is better then any modern one from GE. If you can’t do that, then you should thank the engineers for doing the great job that they really did. If you really want to help or have an input, then forget about concentrating on what a company should have done and concentrate on what you can do for those who’s lives have been affected.

    Also if GE is reading this I would love to see the company to name one GE reactor for each one of the employees who are risking their lives at the plant to avoid what could have truly been a major disaster, I think it would really mean a lot for them and their families.

  • Dave Hancock

    GE, what happened to the Control Rod Drive Pump? Seems, a lack of self sustaining dedicated energy supply; leaves GE at Total Fault. I brought this to your (GE) attention in 1989; ask Jack.

  • Eric S. Smith

    It turns out that plants of this design are at obvious risk of writing themselves off in the case of such an ordinary event as a regional blackout, and Sam says that I’m supposed to apologize to the engineers who thought it up?

    I guess I just haven’t taken enough calculus courses to understand why anyone deserves a cookie for designing a power plant that isn’t actually a bomb — and since its containment buildings keep exploding, it’s arguable that this BWR hasn’t even cleared that bar.

    I would, on the other hand, award a cookie to the designers and builders of a plant with completely passive decay heat handling. I would have thought it an obvious requirement, but then again I’m not an engineering student.

  • Peter Roberts

    Can anyone answer the question posed earlier: why aren’t robots being used to do repairs? Also, was there (is there?) a plan in place for robots to deal with radiation emergencies at nuclear plants? It seems this scenario could be anticipated.

  • David Leben

    Fukushima nuclear power plant(s design contains the term “Torus” at the bottom of the facitltiy. I can’t find anyone to state the foundation design of this building. When Chernobyl had a true meltdown the primary task was to in tomb the fuel burning at 6000 degrees from reaching groundwater. If it had is would have become a much worse disaster. 100’s of tons of this material with eventually melt down to basement at Fukushima nuclear power plant(s). How is the Mark 1 basement foundation compared to Chernobyl? Will the meltdown stop its decent at the Fukushima nuclear power plants foundation. If not, is there groundwater below as in Chernobyl? The meltdown of the core and the spent exposed fuel rods, if not, entombed with make Chernobyl look like a
    “walk in the park”. Chernobyl fuel continues to burn to this day. Please confirm the nature of the foundation design as well as the sedimentary characteristics.

  • Ed Dykes

    John D:

    Concerning solutions, there is one solution and that is water and pumping action, whether the pumping action is mechanical pumps or natural circulation.

    Keeping nuclear reactors safe is surprisingly simple, keep things full of water. The natural disaster was apparently so disruptive that the Japanes were unable to deliver water to the plants. The United States Navy finally delivered two large barges of fresh water, but that was approximately a week into the event. The plants can be depressurized so that low pressure fire systems can put water into them.

    At this stage, it is a matter of cleanup, getting systems back on line and waiting as radiation levels inside of the plants decline. The excess water needs to be pumped out into the ocean, preferably pre-filtered (there are already 10 Billion tons of naturally occuring Uranium plus other radioactive stuff in the oceans).

  • Haakon Dahl

    John’s question number 3 (nuclear waste disposal) can be directed to NIMBYism and eco-daft prohibitions on developing places to actually dispose of nuclear waste; WIPP, Yucca Mountain, Apache Station (or whatever they wanted to call it) and so forth. Spent fuel piles up in temporary storage because the permanent sites never get approval.

  • Ed Dykes

    Haakon Dahl:

    John needs a massive injection of REALITY CHECK. A simple search of the internet will reveal the rather gigantic death rate for other industries. In China alone, several hundred coal miners die every year. Sutdies in the USA by the EPA and other organizations say about 25,000 people die EVERY YEAR with their lives shortened an average of 14 years plus about 15,000 avoidable heart attacks just in the USA alone. Think about the number of coal related deaths in China annually. Anyone who has been over there and breathed the air knows what I am talking about.

    The Union Carbide chemical plant accident in India killed more than 16,000 people. A chemical plant accident in December in Japan killed four people. Airplanes crash and kill hundreds annually.

    We all know about the big natural gas pipeline explosion in California and the others elsewhere that occur periodically.

    The food industry, the medical industry, other means of generating power, etc., are statistically more dangerous than nuclear power. Where is John’s outrage? Nuclear power in actual implementation has resulted in very small risk to human health, and that includes Japan and all the other accidents, in fact a lower risk than solar power in terms of deaths per MWh produced — we need to stop people from falling off of roofs working on their solar panels, so called “solar suicide”.

    The big risk with nuclear power is to the owners of the plant — their financial risk if they don’t implement a robust design, maintain it and operatie it well.

    Concerning spent fuel, the French have reprocessed it since the 1970s and reprocess about a 1,000 tons a year. Dry storage at plant sites after the fuel has cooled down is a perfectly good way to store nuclear fuel. There is surprisingly little of it after all the many years.

    If you want to talk about incompetence, how about the Obama administration? Yucca Mountain was just about ready to store spent fuel and he canceled it. That was after the Federal government extorted $30 Billion from the nuclear industry tover the years through a tax on power produced to build the facility and in general pay the government to handle fuel, which the government never did, and I doubt that the big spenders will give it back. Note that only 75% of Yucca Mountain was for commercial nuclear power. The rest was for government and medical waste. Want to worry about something, where is that medical nuclear waste? How about government waste — think Hanford when you think about government and handling of nuclear waste, now that is scary.

    You want more done with regard to nuclear waste, get the United States government out of the picture except as a regulator.

    And I had better not hear any hog wash from about “there is no solution to the nuclear waste issue”. There are lots of good technical solutions and most of them were developed before 1960, so it is no secret. However, the ding-dongs in government are lawyers and political science majors. I fear that unless engineers learn how to communicate, get elected to public office and relate to morons we are going to continue to go around and around about nonsense.

    While all the morons run around in circles crying that the sky is falling, we read that the average lifespan hit a record in the USA and a big record word-wide. Folks just keep living longer and longer.

    How did that happen with all those nuclear power plants and all that Plutonium out there? Anyone too stupid to answer that question can post on this website and we will hold hands and go through it by baby steps.

    Remember to start worrying about the 10 Billion tons of Uranium in seawater — don’t ever go swimming again in the ocean — and all the Uranium dumped on farm land whenever phosphate fertilizers are applied. Might not it be a good idea to take the naturally occurring Uranium out of the phosphate before dumping it around to grow food? Don’t eat bananas anymore — ever again. Check out the amount of potassium — radioactive K-40 with a half life of 1.25 BILLION YEARS — in bananas. Holy Guacamole!

  • John D

    Ed Dykes (see the thread):

    As a former engineer at G.E. Nuclear in San Jose and having a formal background in physics I’m well aware of the fundamentals of reactor operations and cooling. However also being aware of the situation at Fukushima and my daily contacts with numerous Japanese, both family and friends, that literally
    spans from Hokkaido to Okinawa I have not come across anyone including those at TEPCO, The Japan Ministry, or The U.S Navy, who shares your view of this being “surprisingly simple” or just “cleaning up”.

    It’s true that the occurrence of the “natural disaster” is no one’s fault but the responsibility in response is much different. In that light I much appreciate and applaud Jeffery Immelt’s offer to help Japan in any way possible.

    In close I’ll add that although I understand G.E.’s role in the Fukushima design the solutions to the current problem are not complete until the problem is completely solved and this one is thus far “very complex” with the addition of impacts spanning well beyond a few reactors and who designed them. So to my original point “it is solutions that are needed not defenses”. Once again I will note my applause of Jeffery Immelt’s offer to help Japan in any way possible.

    John D

    I am proud of my years at G.E. and priding oneself in “innovation” or “bringing good things to life” is done through solving the problems at hand and ensuring tomorrow’s issues are addressed today.

  • Lynn

    Did the reactors have boron quenchers are was any boric acid utilized in the water/seawater to help quench the uranium fission. Were any other chemical or other methods deployed to counter-effect or delay some of the sequential damages to the reactor/processes.

    As a former laboratory analyst in the nuclear field, I know that some rod systems are deployed with such. What quenching chemicals were added, if any, to the water brought into or within the system to help stop the reaction? I realize that there will still be other isotopic radiation, but were there other back-up quencing/reaction stabilization methods employed here?

    And what other additional backups were in place for the latter phases of containment of the damaged reactior and its process.

    This is not meant as a criticism. I am simply trying to understand more of what has happened and contribute some food for thought. Sometimes there is a chain reaction in thought processes that stimulates other ideas to the forefront. Rather than assess blame at this point, we must all try to work together.

    Could someone, please, answer this for me?

    Thank you!

  • Lynn

    To John @ March 20, 2011 at 3:18 p.m: You have said so eloquently what I have been trying to ask several people. I have especially been wondering about the passive versus active safety methods and the fact that there was no boron or gadolinium on-site. If there truly were no passive shut-down/quenching methods that could have been utilized in light of the above then the thought of some of this catastrophe that could have been diverted is unbelievable. Of course, noone can think of everything–but, quality control/assurance and oversight is supposed to plan for over and above anything that could plausibly happen when dealing with the catastrophe that could ensue. Was this a business, lack of oversight, or unforeseeable planning issue? Not trying to assess blame for the purpose of blame–but, rather to improve even the oversight and restraints and requirements of old and new technology and business and politics.. Technology is increasing so quickly–it is imperative. Even I, as a uranium-fuel analyst knew about some of this when I worked over a decade ago. I understand hindsight is 20/20 and this was an unbelievable triple-whammy–but, still, passive backup and chemical quenching seemed like possible options that would have been considered because we CANNOT FORESEE every situation. Were these plants unable to utilize any installation of new passive methods and/or chemical quenching? Or did the structure and/or passive methods just fail? I cannot imagine the level of some of these true forces of science and nature.
    To David and Jack Goldmaker on March 18, 2011 I have often wondered about that what I consider fighting fire with fire or fighting like with like concept myself–even before this. And wondered about using jets/aircraft as well…and about the quenching as stated in the aforementioned. Great to be able to think outside the box!!!
    To Herbert J. Bernstein of March 19–I applauds your forward thinking and espousing of the need for more engineering-business ethics. The best time for ethics would be before such disaster and we would benefit from such, I think, if big business would really take interest in the common man and also the future of our planet. There is a time for big business and politics–but energy, health, food, and the preservation of our planet/s ecosystem is above all else–no matter who, what, or where. Again, hindisght is 20/20 and noone can predict every disaster. But, time and time, again, ethics seems to come into the picture with so many of our world disasters. Yes, energy costs need to be contained–but, at what price? It seems Japan’s suffering might have been lessened. This is not to knock the Japanese or any engineers of GE or elsewhere. But, really, there have been so many times that I have seen management scoff at the ideas of others at lower levels in the field or related endeavors–only to have an accident occur. And at times business politics figure into the mix as well as corporate/stock-holder greed. Sometimes there is ignorance, neglect, or just unforeseeable consequences. But, we have seen disasters in space, fuel, medicine, and pollution of our ecosystem such as our oceans and our air and our land in the past and recently. Scientists engineers should be commended for much of what they have contributed. But, we need better executive foresight and communication with the scientists and engineers and we need better business partnership and less greedy politics. As far as I can tell, there seems really good ideas that each of the top nuclear companies have. It is a shame that all the best ideas cannot be put to use. But, unlikely,because of patents, and business, and politics-Not to be pollyanna. NO mortal has all the answers. Unfortunately, it is often not management, but the technical people, who really understand what needs to be changed or implemented. The CEOs and politicos are supposed to be the leaders and have foresight and be able to bring everyone together as needed. Perhap however, lack of true understanding, lack of oversight, greed, and often just the lack of wise restraint and planning all contribute, My prayers to the Japanese people and admiration for their stoicness. And thank you to everyone offering constructive ideas or trying to understand so we may be better citizens and make better decisions in the future. May the world inhabitants put mankind before their personal greed. Thank you!.